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Another conceptual crisis is emerging within the field of development and
technical cooperation, prompting a most proficuous conjuncture to promote change
within the related discursive formations. If we are to go beyond the recycling of theories
and concepts, new formulations need to be based on a critique of the larger field of
development activities.1 After several decades of development, there is no room left for
innocence. Inspired by Durkheim’s (1968) well-known argument that religion is society
worshipping itself, I understand development as economic expansion worshipping itself.
That means we need to know the belief system underlying this devotion as well as the
characteristics of the power field sustaining it.
Power, the central notion in this text, has many definitions. My own conception
is based on a combination of three different sources. For Richard Adams (1967), power
is the control that one party posseses over another party’s environment. Of the several
visions of Max Weber, I will retain that of power as the capacity to make people do
things they do not want to do. Eric Wolf’s (1999) notion of structural power
underscores the capacity historical relationships and forces—especially those that define
access to social labour—have to create and organize settings that constrain people’s
possibilities for action, and to specify the direction and distribution of energy flows.
Power, thus, is about (a) to be the subject of one’s own environment, to be able to
control one’s own destiny, i.e., the course of action or events that will keep one’s life as
it is or will modify it, or (b) to prevent people from becoming such empowered actors.
Since development is always about transformation (Berman, 1987), and typically occurs
through encounters between insiders and outsiders located in different power positions,
ownership of development initiatives is anchored in and influenced by situations where
power inequalities abound. The difficulty of implementing change within the
development community is intimately related to the fact that it is a power field.
Development As a Power Field
Bourdieu (1986) defines a field as a set of relations and interrelations based on
specific values and practices that operate in given contexts. A field is heterogeneous by
definition; it is made up of different actors, institutions, discourses and forces in tension.
Within a field, everything makes sense in relational terms by means of oppositions and
distinctions. Strategies of cooperation or conflict among actors determine whether a
particular doctrine is hegemonic, regardless of its successes or failures (Perrot et al.,
1992, 202-4). The development field is constituted by such actors as those representing
various segments of local populations (local elites and leaders of social movements, for
instance); private entrepreneurs; officials and politicians at all levels of government;
                                                          
1 I share Rist’s opinion that critique needs to be “understood in its Kantian sense of free and public
examination rather than its ordinary sense of unfavourable judgement” (1997, 3).
3personnel of national, international and transnational corporations (different kinds of
contractors and consultants, for example); and staff of international development
organizations (officers of multilateral agencies and regional banks, for instance).
Institutions are also important members of this field; they include various types of
governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches,
unions, multilateral agencies, industrial entities and financial corporations. 
The structure and dynamics of every development field are marked by different
power capabilities and interests that are articulated through historical processes of
networking. Development encompasses different political visions and positions ranging
from an interest in accumulation of economic and political power to an emphasis on
redistribution and equity. In consequence, power struggles are common among actors,
within and across institutions. Differentiated power nodes operate within the web of
relationships and are concretely expressed by the disparities existing between, say, the
capabilities and actions of the World Bank and those of a small NGO in India. Barros
(1996), in her study of environmental global movements and policies, coined the notion
of  “nuclear agents,” those with more power to influence a field’s configuration and
tendencies (in her case, the United Nations, the World Bank and mainstream NGOs).
The development field's most powerful actors and institutions are those alluded to by
the label "development industry." They strive for the reproduction of the field as a
whole, since their own interests are closely connected to the field’s existence. The least
powerful actors and institutions are local groupings disenfranchised by development
initiatives. Those initiatives that destroy the relationships between indigenous peoples,
their territory and culture—such as forced resettlements to build dams—provide the
most obvious scenario of the vulnerability of local populations vis-à-vis "development."
The nature of the power distribution within the development field will depend on
the processes through which networks are formed and on the chararacteristics of the
resulting institutional interventions in the development drama. 
Networking and Consortiation: The Making of Institutions
 Networks related to economic expansion and growth are not new. Since the
industrial revolution, they have operated in the construction of large-scale infrastructure
projects (LSPs), such as canals, railroads, dams and other major works, the
quintessential examples of “development projects.”2 LSPs have structural characteristics
that allow them to be treated as “extreme expressions” of the development field: the size
of the capital, territories and quantities of people they control; their great political
power; the magnitude of their environmental and social impacts; the technological
innovations they often cause; and the complexity of the networks they entail (Ribeiro,
1987). They put together impressive quantities of financial and industrial capital as well
as state and technical elites and workers, fusing local, regional, national, international
and transnational levels of integration.3 As a form of production linked to the expansion
                                                          
2 My choice of focusing on large-scale projects is a methodological one. I am following Kroeber’s (1955)
idea of studying “the most extreme expressions” of a range of phenomena to better understand them. First
military engineers and then civil engineers played a major role in the structuration of this field beginning
in the 18th century (Ribeiro, 1987).
3 Based on Steward (1972), I view levels of integration as a spectrum formed by local, regional, national,
international and transnational levels, with different powers of structuration. For the sake of simplicity and
clarity, I make the following equation: The local level corresponds to the location of our immediate
phenomenological daily experiences, i.e., the set of loci where a person or group carries out regular daily
activities, interacting with or being exposed to different social networks and institutions. The regional level
corresponds to the political/cultural definition of a region within a nation, such as the South in the United
4of economic systems, LSPs have connected relatively isolated areas to wider and more
integrated market systems. Non-linear flows of labour, capital and information among
such projects have happened on a global scale (Ribeiro, 1994 and 1995). Large-scale
projects have relied on powerful institutions—such as governmental and multilateral
organizations, engineering schools, banks and industrial corporations—that have played
important roles in the political economy of the last two centuries. Many of these
institutions have become centres for the diffusion of ideas on new and ever larger
projects; of technological innovations; and of the categories, models and ideologies of
industrial progress and expansion.
Why should we mind these historical connections? Precisely because the field of
development is the heir of many of the beliefs and practices that have been generated
and transmitted within the field of large-scale projects. It is not a coincidence that
multilateral banks, for instance, before the reformist impact of the environmentalist
movement, had large scale infrastructure projects as main items of their portfolio for
many years. The circuits linking projects on national and global scales have made up a
multilocated web through which information and people have circulated. Technical and
managerial solutions have been exchanged and sometimes improved in projects
presented as showcases for the implementation of new methods and technologies.
Because of their huge environmental and social impacts, LSPs have vividly portrayed
the unbalanced power relationships between local populations and developmentalist
outsiders. These projects have also prompted an increase in the reaction capacity of
local actors through social movements and NGOs. People have started to understand the
inequalities inherent to this kind of economic expansion. Foreign capital, expatriate
professionals and technicians have often taken the lion's share of the richness produced
by such enterprises.
The connections among projects over time as well as the intergenerational
continuity that exists within many of the professions involved in LSPs make us more
aware of the need to trace similar connections and continuities in other core areas of the
development field. The World Bank, the “Vatican of international development” (Rich
1994: 195), is a case in point. In its early years, it was the heir not only of many colonial
discourses about what would be known as “Third World Countries,” but also of former
personnel of disappearing colonial administrations (Kraske et al. 1996: 136).
Knowledge about LSPs also allows to see development as a force of expansion
historically intrinsic to globalization, and reveals such expansion as planned
interventions that rely on the establishment of networks of engineers, technicians,
politicians, lobbyists, public servants, and financial and industrial capitalists. Personal
relationships are of utmost importance to navigate through the complex webs of
interests existing in and around projects; they are also the foundations on which many
networks, across and within professional categories, are based and through which
brokerage occurs. These networks frequently join local, regional, national, international
and transnational interests. They are perfect to invigorate the wider, more complex field
of development because they allow for the establishment of different, often ad hoc
coalitions between various actors in the field. To the extent that this flexibility permits
pragmatic and sometimes heterodox alliances that can prove to be effective in many
circumstances, it is also responsible for a certain lack of accountability.
In spite of their vital role in maintaining the synergy of the development field,
networks are too fluid to provide the regularity, stability, rational planning and foresight
                                                                                                                                                                         
States, or Galicia in Spain. The national, international and transnational levels refer to the existence of the
nation-state, and to the different existing relationships within and without it.
5needed for development interventions. Networking pragmatism, thus, is an effective
instrument, reflected in the strong ability of networks to move from local to national,
international and transnational scenarios; but it also engenders a relative loss of
homogeneity among the resulting collective subjects, who often exist as target-oriented
coalitions that are dismantled once the task is accomplished. This is why networks may be
characterized as pragmatic, fragmented, disseminated, circumstancial and even volatile
actors. Their strength comes from these characteristics and from a heterogeneity that
enables them to match the fluidity of a changing political and economic field with more
effectiveness than traditional actors, who are often bound by the need for internal
ideological, organizational and political coherence and cohesiveness (with its consequent
weight and institutional investment of energy). Such an apparent unity serves as an
external identity that qualifies traditional actors as representative of a segment, a
corporation or of precisely delimited interests. But the weakness of networks comes also
from networking pragmatism; it hinders networks from becoming actors who could have a
longer and stronger presence if they were consolidated into a more homogeneous and
coherent subject with a shared programmatic objective.In consequence, networks are
joined by other entities within the field of development. 
When networks reach a point where they have well-defined, lasting interests and
goals, they tend to become institutions based not only in personal relationships but also
in bureaucratic rationales. Institutions are the crystallizations of networks that have
clear-cut projects in sight and within the foreseeable future. "Institution-building"
involves a great amount of technical cooperation and monitoring, and is a form of
domesticating the unpredictable environments where "development" occurs. 
Development institutions are bureaucracies of different size and complexity. As
Max Weber (1977) has pointed out, bureacracies are a form of domination, of exerting
power. The larger the development initiatives, the larger the bureaucracies related to
them and the stronger their capacity to exert power, especially over institutions and
actors operating at lower levels of integration. With their hierarchies, rules and
reproductive needs, bureaucracies are machines of indifference (Herzfeld, 1992):
Accountability, Weber tells us, is what bureaucracy is all about; and
accountability is what many bureaucrats invest enormous amounts of efforts in
short-circuiting or avoiding. A cynic might define power...as the right to be
unaccountable (ibid., 122).
This “right to be unaccountable” has motivated many reactions and much
opposition to development bureaucracies worldwide. Counterhegemonic networks,
made up of NGOs, social movements, unions, churches, etc., have played fundamental
roles in protecting the interests of local populations against the great quantity of power
amassed by development institutions. Many of the now frequent criticisms development
institutions themselves express about the nature of their operations have to be
understood in light of the pressures and struggles of such counterhegemonic networks.
The fact that bureaucrats or technocrats of development agencies critize their own
modes of operation is not necessarily a contradiction, as it may seem in the first place. It
is inherent to the rationale of bureaucracies to produce their own criticism, as a way of
disseminating and naturalizing the very bureaucratic structure they seem to criticize and,
sometimes, oppose (Herzfeld, 1992). In fact, and this is especially true in the history of
development, the capacity to produce excuses for failures, to recycle formulations and
6to create new panaceas is part of the “idioms of self-exoneration” (ibid., 46) in many
institutions.4
Bureaucracies are also power fields. Criticism and opposition to mainstream
policies are related to the power struggles that develop within and without institutions at
certain junctures. The dispute within the World Bank over the Narmada River Basin
Development Project in India is an example of the intricacies of such political struggles
(Rich, 1994). Criticism, though, has limits. In spite of the efforts institutions make to
censor their staff, sometimes staff make alliances with counterhegemonic networks at
their own risk. The punishment for such heresies is often outright dismissal; the
bureaucratic orthodoxy and theodicy needs to seem immaculate.
Max Weber (1977, 708) had already noticed the impossibility of a pure form of
bureaucratic domination. Within the development field, personal relations are critical in
such relevant moments as recruitment of new staff members and promotion of like-
minded political allies. In fact, the prominence of “instrumental friendship,” a major
engine of networking, is so strong in large bureaucratic organizations that networks
usually congeal into cliques within those settings (Wolf, 2001a [1966], 174 and ff.).
Especially in situations of power imbalance, cliques have “important instrumental
functions in rendering an unpredictable situation more predictable and in providing for
mutual support against surprise upsets from within or without” (ibid., 179). Wolf
concludes that “an interesting perspective” about large organizations “may be gained by
looking upon them as organizations of supply for the cliques, rather than the other way
round” (ibid.).
Institutions also become engaged in several networks within the field of
development. They make up networks in complex historical and political processes. I
named these processes consortiation, to call attention to their resulting entity: the
consortium (Ribeiro, 1994). Institutions are the building blocks of consortia that, in
turn, become new institutions that may become the units of new and more complex
consortia. Consortiation is fundamental to understanding the development field, since it
is the galvanizing process that transforms networks of institutions into consortia
destined to fulfill delimited roles as defined by a given "project."5 Consortiation is a
political process, commanded by power groups that operate at upper levels of
integration. It is a chainlike movement that—through the organization of new task-
oriented economic and administrative entities—actually links, within a project,
international, national, and regional institutions and capitals. It is a way to reinforce
capitalist relationships in a pyramidal fashion, where upper levels hegemonize lower
levels. The consortium is the concrete social, economic and political entity that
articulates different power groups. The political-economic process of consortiation
directly affects the potential of projects for development. Consortiation implies that
projects reinforce competition and the concentration of capital and power among
                                                          
4 Building on Weber’s concept of theodicy, a concept related to the various ways in which religious
systems sought to interpret the apparent contradiction of evil persistence in a divinely ordered world,
Herzfeld (1992, 7) proposes that “secular theodicy...provides people with social means of coping with
disappointment. The fact that others do not always challenge even the most absurd attempts at explaining
failure...[may be] the evidence of a very practical orientation, one that refuses to undermine the
conventions of self-justification because virtually everyone...may need to draw on them in the course of a
lifetime.”
5 The following arguments are based on my study of the construction of the Yacyretá dam (Ribeiro,
1994). Keeping the differences in mind, consortiation also happens in smaller projects and in those that
are implemented in the name of “sustainable development” (Pareschi, 2001).
7capitalist firms; it facilitates the process of capital and power concentration by
eliminating weaker competitors and co-opting a few selected ones.
Consortiation involves a two-way process. On one hand, it allows selected
smaller units to participate as junior partners in tasks larger than what their financial,
technological and managerial capacities would allow. On the other hand, it is a way of
facilitating the access of larger corporations to new and often protected or highly
disputed markets. Through different discourses on a project’s potential for regional and
national development, the weakest partners in the associative chain legitimate their
claims for larger participation. Regional development is thus a common argument
among companies that operate at the local or regional level in competition with national
or international corporations. By the same token, national development is the argument
national corporations use to defend their interests over international and transnational
capital. Given the two-way characteristic of consortiation, the discourses on regional
and national development may be an argument that the strongest partners, that is, those
representing larger capital or power concentrations, use to legitimate the need for the
project. The eloquence of the development argument is evident when the co-optation of
smaller unities down the scale is needed.
Consortia are a means corporations have to optimize the use of different
networks that must be activated for reaching different economic and political goals. For
instance, a consortium operating at the conjunction of the international and national
systems, and formed by national and transnational power groups, may lobby both
national and international-multilateral institutions. Forming a consortium always
implies a negotiation, a process based not only on economic and managerial criteria.
The intervention of powerful actors—the controllers or owners of state, national and
transnational capital—generates a field of power negotiations that is eminently
politically structured. Choosing national partners, for instance, is a strategic decision
that takes into account that strong political support within the national state may be
more valuable than financial or technical support. In fact, the definition of each
partner’s share in a contract is due at least as much to political articulations,
networkings and lobbying as to the technical assessment of a partner’s technical,
production and financial capacity. Consortiation is, thus, at the same time, a tool for
economic expansion and a means of establishing a political field where brokers of
different networks establish their conditions for participating in actual projects. From
the ground up, development is the ideology/utopia that cements the diverse
stakeholders, networks and institutions.
Development: An Ideology and Utopia of Expansion
Ideologies and utopias are essentially related to power. They express disputes
over interpretations of the past (ideology) or of the future (utopia), and struggle to
institute hegemony by establishing certain retrospective or prospective visions as the
truth, as the natural world order (Manheim, n.d.; Ricoeur, 1986). Since World War II,
development as a system of beliefs has always been involved with particular readings of
the past and formulations about the future on a global scale (Ribeiro, 1992). In his
analysis of development, Escobar (1995) considers it as equivalent to colonial
discourse. From a different angle, Gilbert Rist (1997, 218) treats development as a
system of beliefs organically related to the worldwide expansion of integrated market
systems, and as the “mobilizing slogan of a social movement that created messianic
organizations and practices.”
8The end of the Soviet Union (1989-91) prompted striking rearrangements within
the world system and opened the way for the consolidation of different ideologies and
utopias of global reach. In the 1990s, two related discourses became hegemonic:
sustainable development and globalization. Both seem to be reaching their limits as
mobilizing slogans for the 21st century, opening a new round of ideological/utopian
struggles and new opportunities for change. For radical or minor reforms of
development and cooperation, a critical knowledge of development’s value systems and
grammar is as crucial as laying bare its structuration as a power field. The exposure of
the obsolescence of hegemonic discourses is always necessary in order to go beyond
them. What is at stake is whether social actors will accept new discourses on their fates.
Development is one of the most inclusive discourses in common sense and
within the specialized literature. Its importance for the organization of social, political
and economic relations has led anthropologists to consider it as “one of the basic ideas
in modern West European culture” (Dahl and Hjort, 1984, 166), and “something of a
secular religion,” unquestioned, since “to oppose it is a heresy almost always severely
punished” (Maybury-Lewis, 1990, 1). The scope and multiple facets of development are
what allow its many appropriations and frequently divergent readings. The plasticity of
development is central for the assurance of its continued viability; it is “always in the
process of transforming itself, of fulfilling promises” (DSA, n.d., 4-5). The variation of
the appropriations of the idea of development, as well as the attempts to reform it, are
expressed in the numerous adjectives that are part of its history: industrial, capitalist,
socialist, inward, outward, community, unequal, dependent, sustainable, human. These
variations and tensions reflect not only the historical experiences accumulated by
different power groups in their struggles for hegemony within the development field,
but also diverse moments of integration of the world capitalist system. 
Since the 19th century, and more so after World War II, the increased pace of
integration of the world system has required ideologies and utopias that could make
sense of the unequal positions within the system, and that could provide an explanation
through which people placed in lower levels would believe that there is a solution for
their "backward" situation. It is not by accident that development terminology has
usually involved the use of metaphors that refer to space or order in a hierarchical way:
developed/underdeveloped, advanced/backward, first world/third world, etc. This
hierarchy is instrumental to the belief that there is a point that may be reached by
following some kind of recipe kept by those nation-states that lead the "race" for a
better future. By using the term "development," instead of accumulation or expansion,
undesirable connotations are avoided: such as the difference of power between the units
of the system (within or among nation-states) in economic, political and military terms;
and the fact that development is “a simple expression of a pact between internal and
external groups interested in accelerating accumulation” (Furtado, 1978, 77).
Development operates as a system of classification by establishing taxonomies
of peoples, societies and regions. Edward Said  (1994) and Arturo Escobar (1995) have
shown the relationship between creating a geography, a world order and power. It may
be said with Herzfeld (1992, 110) that “creating and maintaining a system of
classification has always...characterized the exercise of power in human societies.”
Classifications often produce stereotypes useful to subject people through
simplifications that justify indifference to heterogeneity. Stereotypes can hardly hide
their power functions under the surface of the idiom of development and cooperation,
the lexicon of which is full of dualisms that refer, in static or dynamic ways, to transient
states or relationships of subordination (developed/underdeveloped; developing
9countries; emergent markets; see Perrot et al., 1992, 189). Stereotypes may also become
keywords – such as, aid, help, donors/recipients, donors/beneficiaries -- that clearly
indicate, in not so subtle ways, the power imbalance between two sets of actors and
legitimate the transformation of one set of them into objects of development initiatives.
Development’s claim to inevitability is but another facet of its claim to
universalism. The fact that development is part of a wider belief system marked by
Western cultural matrices poses great limitations to its universalist claims, and is
another reason why, in many non-Western contexts, local people are reluctant to
become development subjects. It is hard to disagree that there is no universal method for
achieving a "good life" (Rist, 1997, 241). Development’s prehistory reflects such
Western discursive matrices as the belief in progress (which can be traced back to
ancient Greece: see Delvaille, 1969; Dodds, 1973) and others related to such important
turning points as the Enlightenment—a crucial moment for the unfolding of the
economic, political and social pacts of modernity and its associated ideologies and
utopias (industrialism, secularism, rationalization and individualism, for instance).
Leonard Binder (1986, 10-12) recognizes, in certain theories of development, an even
narrower matrix: the image of the United States, “as some liberals would like us to be.”
More recently, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, sustainable development reverberated
with notions of proper relationships between humankind and nature that were typical of
Protestant, urban middle classes in countries such as Germany, England and the United
States (Ribeiro, 1992). 
In reality, development is another example of a globalizing discourse, similar to
what Appadurai calls ideascapes—“elements of the Enlightenment worldview, which
consists of a concatenation of ideas, terms and images, including ‘freedom,’ ‘welfare,’
‘rights,’ ‘sovereignty,’ ‘representation’ and the master term ‘democracy’” (1990, 9-10). In
this connection, terms such as “ethnodevelopment,” coined to refer to indigenous models
of development or to alternative models that would respect local values and cultures, are
oxymorons. They undoubtedly reflect legitimate aspirations, but are located on the fine and
paradoxical line of accepting development as a universal category.6
I will briefly mention other anthropological issues that make development’s
pretension to universalism problematic. The first one is the existence of notions of time
that are radically different (Lévi-Strauss, 1980). Development relies on a conception that
envisages time as a linear sequence of stages endlessly advancing towards better
moments. One implication of such a Western construct is that growth, transformation
and accumulation become guiding principles of polities. But in many non-Western
societies, time is understood as cycles of eternal recommencements, favoring the
flourishing and consolidation of contemplation, adaptation and homeostasis as pillars of
their cosmologies. Along the same line, we cannot underestimate the role of the control
of time—particularly of the clock, the mother of mechanical complexity—in economic
                                                          
6 On ethnodevelopment, see Stavenhagen (1985) and Davis (1988), for instance. In the book
Autodesarrollo Indígena en las Américas (IWGIA, 1989), ethnodevelopment was substituted for
"indigenous self-development," apparently because the indigenous participants of the symposium
organized by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs “did not like the concept of
‘ethnodevelopment’ and preferred to conceive of development as a type of self-determination” (IWGIA,
1989, 10). Critical anthropological readings of Western ideologies/utopias pose dilemmas that may hurt
one’s own political predilections. Accountability, for instance, is clearly not a universal category. In his
cross-cultural study of bureaucracies, Herzfeld (1992, 47) concluded that “accountability is a socially
produced, culturally saturated amalgam of ideas about person, presence, and polity.... (I)ts meanings are
culturally specific, and its operation is constrained by the ways in which its operators and clients interpret
its actions. Its management of personal or collective identity cannot break free of social experience.”
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development in the past centuries (Landes, 1983). Synchronicity and predictability are
the basis of capitalist and industrial labour relations. Another major divide is the
transformation of nature into a commodity, a historical process related to the unfolding
of capitalism and modernity (Jameson, 1984) that seems to be reaching its climax with
capital exploring the code of life (biotechnology) and virtuality (cyberspace and other
technological forms of virtuality are more and more crucial to economic activities).
Many of the impasses between developers and indigenous peoples have been based on
this cosmological difference. What for some are mere resources, for others may be
sacred places and elements.
Cultural shocks form the wider scenario where the issues of language and
rationality are located. Language in general, and written language in particular, is a
major barrier for communication within the development field. To cooperate, people
need to understand, and communicative competence is not a resource equally distributed
within development networks. Furthermore, linguistic competence, as Bourdieu  noted
(1983 [1977], 161 and ff.) cannot be separated from power analysis. Who speaks, to
whom, through what media, and in what constructed circumstances are vital elements of
any communication process. The relation between written language and power is even
more evident, as writing is central to the development of states and to bureaucracies,
making it possible, among other things, to present rules as impersonal artefacts (Goody,
1986). Herzfeld (1992, 19-20) links the idea of a perfectly context-free, abstract
language and the Western model of rationality to a desire for transcendence that is
typical of “Judeo-Christian and Indo-European concepts of the superiority of mind over
matter.” The “ability to represent some forms of language” as context-free is where “the
exercise of power lies” (ibid., 119).
Illiteracy is a major barrier within the development field, especially for those
projects defending local participation. Planning is the heart of the rational development
initiative, and it relies on the establishment of written rules and instructions that need to
be followed if efficiency, bureaucratic accountability and goals are to be attained.
Projects are the artefacts that summarize the need for control over time, people and
resources. Accounting, legal definitions, plans, rational goals and the use of
technologies are highly dependent on sharing the same cultural horizon and on certain
levels of education. Project failure is almost certain if developers are unable to make
people in the field understand what a project is, and how to implement or use it. This
historical and sociological predicament is the raison d’être of technical cooperation and
of capacity development. It is also a main cause of processes such as the export of the
intelligence of projects to foreign centres and brain drain—two perverse effects that
reinforce structural inequalities among nation-states. Since culture and education are
structural determinants of the lifeways of societies, and do not change at the pace that
development projects require, expatriates or outsiders from other regions of a same
country are often sent to compensate for local deficiencies. Their commitment to local
life is temporary. They are often members of networks that reproduce themselves in
national, international and transnational levels of integration.
It is true that transformation is the core of development as ideology and utopia,
and that many times transformation is longed for by local people of different cultural
backgrounds. Indeed, it is in the nature of some innovations to captivate people, since
the changes they bring about may make their lives more comfortable, safer and
healthier. The reasons why some people accept change while others don’t are complex.
But at least three points need to be made about transformations, change and
technological innovations: (a) the nature of the transformation and of the context where
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it will be introduced define whether change will be welcome or not; (b) transformations,
change and technological innovations are cultural artefacts that always involve and
affect power systems; and (c) they impact social, cultural and environmental systems in
varying degrees (from sheer disaster to minor palatable changes). There is no doubt that
some projects may enhance a community’s access to modernity. But it is also true that
"development" does not mean structural changes in power distribution, this being the
source of much critique against it. Rist puts it straightforwardly: “Those in power have
no interest in change (whatever they say to the contrary), and those who want change do
not have the means to impose it” (1997, 243).
The Power Imbalance: Who Is the Subject of Development? 
"Development dramas" are complex kinds of encounters that join local actors
and institutions with outsiders. The fact that outsiders may pretend to plan a
community’s future is indicative of their differential power in the encounter. In such
circumstances, a dichotomy is installed. On one hand, there are the goals and rationales
of the planners; on the other hand, the destiny and culture of the communities. Before
the existence of a development project, local people could hardly conceive that their fate
was susceptible to being hijacked by an organized group of people. In reality,
planning—i.e., determining ahead of time how a certain reality will be—implies the
appropriation by outsiders of local populations’ power over their own destiny. From
being subjects of their own lives, people become objects of prescient technical elites.
Development creates two kinds of subjects, one active, the other passive.
Passive-subjects are people transformed as objects of development mandates—forced
resettlement represents the extreme case. Ownership will hardly occur, if at all. Local
actors are frequently confronted with the odd options of either establishing patron-client
relationships with developmentalist outsiders, or struggling to regain control over their
lives and environments. In fact, such passive-subjects are prone to resist development,
since they relate to its most authoritarian face. But development also creates active-
subjects. The agents of development are local people who are likely to become allies of
development initiatives because they can identify benefits and interests they have in
common with outsiders. The existence of these two kinds of subjects shows that
ownership of development initiatives depends heavily on two variables differently
distributed within the development drama. One is access to power, to being able to
control one’s own environment and to avoid being the object of outsiders’ will or of the
imperatives of structural, faceless, expansionist forces. The other is access to knowledge
and information that enables actors to understand what is happening and, more
importantly, what will happen to them. Resistance or participation are the results of the
ways these variables are combined. Self-confidence and ownership can thrive only
where actors feel they have power over their environment.
There are two current modes of generating active/passive-subjects and of dealing
with them. The top-down approach tends to create passive-subjects. This authoritarian
mode is based on networks that co-opt local elites, establish no compensatory policies
for those impacted by projects, and have no preoccupation with local models and
cultures. The bottom-up approach intends to create active-subjects and is more
ownership-friendly. This participatory mode turns out to be an attempt to compensate
for the structural loss of power that characterizes the relations between local populations
and outsiders when a project is initiated. Participation and partnership become
buzzwords that cannot mask the fact that everyone in the development drama knows
where ultimate decision-making power is located. It is true that this mode is more
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sensitive to local cultures and models, including indigenous models of management (on
the latter, see Marsden, 1994). 
Both approaches usually share an instrumental notion of culture. Culture
becomes a “managerial technology of intervention in reality” (Barbosa, 2001, 135).
Such a functional notion conceives culture as a set of interrelated, adjusted, coherent
behaviours and meanings that can be identified and valued in terms of their positive or
negative impact on the attainment of goals. This notion of culture fits well within the
development field, because it adjusts perfectly to the terminology and rationale of
planners. But it misrepresents at least two major considerations about culture: (a)
contradiction and incoherence are part of human experience; and (b) culture is
embedded in and traversed by historically defined relations of power (therefore, cultural
change always relates to power change).
Indeed, whatever the approach, top-down or bottom-up, local power and
political systems will always be impacted by development interventions. Given the
characteristics of the networking and consortiation processes typical of the development
field, local power systems are modules of wider power circuitries that are ruled by
upper-level institutions. As we know, transnational, international, national and regional
institutions and actors tend to have more power within the networking/consortiation
processes because they start with and can move more resources. The authoritarian top-
down approach tends to reinforce existing political elites that acted as brokers in the
past. It tends, thus, to reinforce previously existing differences in class, gender, age,
race and ethnicity. In contrast, the bottom-up participatory approach tends to introduce
new leadership, thereby creating new tensions within the pre-existing power and
political systems. 
Both approaches produce “brokers” (Wolf 2001b, [1956], 138), who usually
amass a great quantity of power. Such middle-people connect the intersections of
different levels of integration and serve the interests of the groups they intermediate
between. But “they must also maintain a grip on...(the) tensions (between the groups
they serve), lest conflict get out of hand and better mediators take their place (ibid.).” In
consequence, gatekeepers proliferate within the development field and consume much
of its resources. These mediators create power networks of their own (made up of
NGOs, consultants, officers of multilateral agencies, union and social movement
leaders, etc.) within which much of the technical cooperation actually happens. Brokers
are necessary in any development field, because mediation is intrinsic to networking
and consortiation processes. But to enhance cooperation, gatekeepers, i.e., brokers
specialized in accumulating personal power, need to have their power regulated. Many
of the results of development projects are related to the nature of the brokerage system
and the power effects and distortions it may generate.
Programmatic Challenges 
In this text, I presented the main limitations and pressures affecting technical
cooperation and development. There are no easy solutions for the conflicts of power
created by the development field. Only by changing the characteristics of the power
distribution within this field will technical cooperation and development really change.
This implies that all actors and institutions within the networks have to "do" politics
consciously and constantly to keep their interests alive. The socialization of knowledge
of risks and opportunities involving change brought by development is important to
improve the quality of the information that actors handle in these political arenas. In
consequence, networks need to be democratic assemblages of institutions and actors
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with the real capacity to decide and intervene, especially if the outcome of such
decision-making processes does not please the most powerful interests involved in a
given project. To achieve these goals, public spheres to discuss and decide development
issues need to be fostered, multiplied and made ever more inclusive. The diffusion of a
democratic pedagogy should traverse the whole development field and its networks,
from upper-level managers and state officials to grassroots leadership. The associative
processes typical of the development field should be opened to participants in such
ways as to equalize the power of actors operating at all levels of integration. These are
major tasks for all interested in transparency, accountability and the strengthening of
civil society. They will encounter much resistance among powerful actors interested in
the status quo and among those for whom democracy is not a value. 
To move forward in a globalized world, where multiculturalism is increasingly a
transnational political issue, we must admit that development is not everyone’s object of
desire. Rather, much more open perspectives should be fostered, visions that are
sensitive to different cultural and political contexts. Concomitantly with the
redistribution of power within the development field, different principles and
sensibilities need to be disseminated. Development cosmology and idioms have to be
radically reformed. Development cannot insist on supposing that the West is universal.
Technical cooperation cannot continue to use a language contaminated with metaphors
of inequality and hierarchy. If local populations and institutions do not devise
themselves as active-subjects of development, ownership will remain a problem, and
technical cooperation will reinforce structural inequalities among nation-states.
Globalization processes, especially those related to the new technologies of
communication, are promoting many changes in the relationships between local and
global settings. The position of local subjects has evolved in ways that may shift the
balance towards more participatory approaches within the development field. In spite of
its unequal distribution, the Internet is enhancing the capacity for intervention among
NGOs and social movements. This virtual public space is the techno-symbolic
environment of the transnational virtual-imagined community, and a most useful tool to
reinforce local voices and articulations of heterogeneous political actors in a
transnational world (Ribeiro, 1998 and 2001). 
On a more integrated planet, new challenges arise and call for cosmopolitan
political and technical elites prone to accept the global development field as a
heteroglossic community, where power imbalances need to be constantly negotiated in
political and cultural terms. Conflict is the alternative to making heterogeneity a central
value for promoting human conviviality, creativity and capacity of innovation. 
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